APUSH Chris Schmidt

DBQ May 1^st, 2001

World War II was a disastrous, worldwide conflict that affected all the corners of the earth. Even after VE day in Europe, the war continued for more than 3 months, until VJ day in mid-August of 1945. This war in Japan ended a short time after the atomic bombing of two cities in Japan. However, the decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post Second World War era, rather than a strictly military measure designed to force Japan’s unconditional surrender.

The US at the time of the bombing of Hiroshima was led by Harry S. Truman, who had been pushed into the position of leadership by the death of Roosevelt. The bombing was almost three months to the day after the defeat of Germany in Europe. This date is of major significance when considering the relation between the dropping of the bomb and the affect on Russia, because of part of the agreements made at the Yalta Conference. This was a meeting of the "Big Three" – the Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain - to discuss the plans for winning the war. At this conference, the Soviet Union promised to begin helping in the battle in the Pacific Theater three months after the defeat of Germany. At that time, there was no knowledge of whether an atom bomb was even possible, and especially possible to create in time for the use as an offensive tool in the war. The way the date was set up for this bombing, merely 2 days before the Red Army was to join in the war, would seem to indicate that the US dropped the bomb to end the war without the need of help from the Soviets.

Japan at the time of the bombing in Hiroshima was a country in shambles. The bombing runs of the Allies had destroyed over 2 million homes, and much of the Japanese industry had already been destroyed (Document B). In 1945, James Byrnes knew, "that Japan was essentially defeated and that [the US] could win the war in another six months (Document F)". Both these documents would seem to say that the dropping of an atomic bomb on the town of Hiroshima was not necessary as a purely military measure. Japan had been fighting a two front war against China and the US for 3 years, and with mine emplacements preventing necessary supplies from arriving (Document B), many industries were not able to create the tools needed for the Japanese forces to continue fighting. Based on this information, Japan was already on the verge of defeat, and it was not necessary to drop the bomb as a strictly military measure.

The US did not want the Soviet Union to have to enter the war in Japan. According to General Eisenhower, the reports coming out of the battleground indicated the "imminence of Japan’s collapse," and the United States "ought not to put ourselves in the position of requesting or begging for Soviet aid (Document C)." The US did not want Russian participation in the war against Japan (Document E). This was for several reasons, one of which was the fear that the Soviets would want to expand their communist ideas in the area of China as well as eastern European countries. The US government was "concerned about the spreading of Russian influence in Europe" (Document F) if the Red Army joined US forces in an assault on the mainland of Japan. As Churchill recalled in 1953, the Russians would not be needed to win the war. All this indicates that the bomb was used to curb the spread of Russian influence in Europe and Asia.

The US decided to use the bomb not as a purely military action against Japan, but as a tool to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post WWII era. The timing of the bombing, the state of Japan before the attack and the wish by the US to curb Russian influence in Europe all indicate that it was not a military tactic, but a political tool.